We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-pro…ts and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-pro…ts in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-pro…t form more attractive to managers. We show that if …rms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-pro…t …rms would be competed out by for-pro…t …rms. Therefore, the choice between not-for-pro…t and for-pro…t provision is not always a question of resolving incentive problems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of workers plays an important role in this choice.
Introduction
The strength of the not-for-pro…t sector has long puzzled economists in the light of the basic assumption that …nancial incentives are an important engine of economic activity in a market economy. 1 The existing view of notfor-pro…ts is that they are a second-best response to certain types of incentive problems. 2 One set of theories focus on contract failure (Hansmann, 1980) and argue that the not-for-pro…t status enables the management to commit to a higher level of quality or to ensure that donated money or labor will not be appropriated for private gain (e.g., Easely and O'Hara, 1983, Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001 , and Bilodeau and Slivinski, 2004) . Another set of theories (see, Francois, 2000, and 2003 ) focus on free-riding within a …rm and argue that the not-for-status might be a credible commitment device on the part of the management to supply less e¤ort than in a for-pro…t …rm, thereby inducing greater labor donation from intrinsically motivated workers. Both sets of theories of not-for-pro…ts either show or implicitly assume that they are a welfare-enhancing institution.
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-pro…ts based on free-riding, and show that it suggests an alternative, somewhat darker view of not-for-pro…ts. The starting point of the labor donation theory is that not-for-pro…ts tend to be concentrated in activities that have a public good element, and that volunteering is an important source of labor in these organizations. 3 We show that not-for-pro…t organizations may exist in these activities because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the 1 A study of 26 countries conducted in the mid 1990s (Salamon et al, 1999) , for example, found that not-for-pro…ts employed an average 6.8 percent of the non-agricultural workforce (12% in the case of the US). Another study of eight OECD countries about a decade later (Salamon et al, 2007) show that not-for-pro…ts contributed 8% to the GDP on average (7.2% in the case of the US).
2 See Rose-Ackerman (1996) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for excellent surveys of the literature. 3 Health, education, and social services account for 61% of the contribution of not-forpro…ts to GDP on average in the eight countries studied by Salamon et al (2007) . About half of the 14 million full-time employees in the US not-for-pro…t sector work on voluntary basis and volunteer time accounts for about a quarter of not-for-pro…t contribution to GDP on average in the seven countries studied by Salamon et al (2007) .
non-pro…t form more attractive to managers without any concomitant gain in welfare compared to for-pro…ts. The choice between not-for-pro…t and forpro…t provision is therefore not only a question of resolving incentive problems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers.
We then proceed to embed the choice of for-pro…ts vs. not-for-pro…ts in a labor market setting where …rms and workers match endogenously. We show that if motivated workers are scarce then competition for them would lead for-pro…t …rms to drive away not-for-pro…t …rms. We also show that if managers are su¢ ciently motivated, either …nancially or intrinsically, they will switch to for-pro…ts. Similarly, if workers are very motivated then managers will prefer for-pro…ts, the same as if the workers are not motivated at all.
Our goal is not to argue that not-for-pro…ts are undesirable but to highlight a particular e¤ect that strikes a cautionary note on thinking about their welfare consequences. The labor donation theory based on free riding and the theories based on contract failure suggest distinct but not mutually exclusive mechanisms. In a model that combines both, the negative welfare results will be mitigated.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of understanding organizational choice between for-pro…ts and not-for-pro…ts in a (labor) market setting and has several empirical implications. For example, it suggests that the importance of not-for-pro…ts relative to for-pro…ts within a sector would depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers. Also, it implies that measures of labor market slackness (e.g., the unemployment rate) might be an important omitted variable to reckon with in studies that look at the e¤ect of not-for-pro…t status on wages and labor donations.
Our paper starts o¤ with a model of organizational choice similar to Francois (2003) . The basic assumption is that both managers and workers are intrinsically motivated by the success of the project. E¤ort by either of the two leads to a successful outcome and the worker moves …rst. This gives rise to a free-rider problem in the …rm, as long as the manager has an incentive to exert e¤ort when the worker did not do so yet. The choice of not-for-pro…t status by the owner/manager of a …rm can then be understood as an attempt to resolve the arising free-rider problem within the …rm.
Not-for-pro…t status is chosen because it reduces …nancial incentives for the management and commits it to non-provision of the public good. This commitment guarantees workers that their individual contribution will make a di¤erence in provision and allows managers to reduce the wage payment.
The resulting gain can compensate the manager for lost pro…ts and makes the not-for-pro…t an attractive choice for the manager. In other words, the not-for-pro…t status is chosen for projects that are …nancially not too bene…cial because it makes more e¤ective use of the worker's intrinsic bene…ts from public good provision.
However, we show that the adoption of not-for-pro…t status by the manager increases the burden for the worker. If worker-manager matches arise endogenously in a labor market, not-for-pro…t …rms can only compete with for-pro…t …rms when there is an oversupply of motivated labor. If labor is scarce, not-for-pro…ts are crowded out. This …nding provides a new possible explanation for the association between volunteer labor and not-for-pro…t status, namely, the abundance of motivated labor in some sectors.
If both for-pro…ts and not-for-pro…ts are feasible we show that not-forpro…ts are (weakly) dominated by for-pro…ts in terms of welfare. This result is even stronger if we introduce some uncertainty and projects can fail with some probability even if either the worker or the manager supplies e¤ort.
An important feature of the model is that organizational choice only a¤ects the distribution of rents within the …rm but not the nature of production. We assume that intrinsic motivation is output-based where output is single-dimensional and there is no second dimension like consumer welfare or quality. This implies that …nancial incentives do not harm consumer or donor welfare -whoever bene…ts from the project just cares about project success. We do not do this because we think it is particularly realistic but in order to separate out the labor donation theory based on free riding from the contract failure literature in a clear-cut way.
This article is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature in greater detail in section 2. Section 3 presents the model in two steps. In sections 3.1 we lay down the basic framework, and in section 3.2 we analyze the case of exogenous matching between workers and managers to derive the basic mechanism by which not-for-pro…ts can arise. In section 3.3 we discuss endogenous matching to show the e¤ects of labor scarcity on organizational choice. The welfare implications of not-for-pro…t provision are discussed in section 3.4. Section 4 presents an extension. We show that the commitment of the manager to no e¤ort via the not-for-pro…t status is likely to come with a strict cost in terms of welfare if production has a stochastic element.
Section 5 discusses some empirical implications of our …ndings, and section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
The key idea behind the contract failure literature is that by limiting monetary incentives for owners not-for-pro…ts enable the managers to commit to higher quality (e.g., if there is an underlying cost-quality trade-o¤) and/or attract key inputs from others (e.g., donations, labor). Hansmann (1980) provides a brief analysis of the role of not-for-pro…ts in signalling and screening managers who vary (unobservably) in terms of how much weight they put on money versus the output of the organization. Easely and O'Hara (1983) model a society that is interested in maximizing welfare. The basic con ‡ict in their framework is between the manager of a …rm and consumers of …rm output. They show that when output cannot be observed by society then managers have the incentive to raise their own utility and delivering less to the consumers. The nondistribution constraint works as a simple constraint to this behavior. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) model the incentives of a manager who chooses between a for-and not-for-pro…t setting. They argue that pro…t incentives might lead to undesirable outcomes from the point of view of donors who value the non-contractible outcome of the …rm. Their argument is related to the multi-tasking argument of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) .
Motivating an agent on a contractible task (e¤ort in increasing output or reducing costs) might lead to undesirable outcomes because another noncontractible task (e¤ort in improving quality) is neglected. They show that not-for-pro…ts remain attractive for managers because the reduced …nancial incentive in the not-for-pro…t is compensated by the increase in donations. 4 A similar argument is made by Bilodeau and Slivinski (2004) , who show that the non-distribution constraint provides the entrepreneur with a means of committing to not appropriate funds which others wish to assign to the provision of the public good, and so it induces higher donations by the public.
An important recent contribution by Francois (2000) provides a formal analysis of the theory of labor donations. He starts o¤ with the premise that workers are intrinsically motivated in certain activities. He looks at an environment where there is a problem of moral hazard in teams or free riding within the organization. He shows that when workers receive intrinsic motivation from the provision of an output, the …rm faces a public good problem. If the manager is very motivated to provide the output, he needs to pay the worker a higher wage to motivate e¤ort because the worker knows that provision is likely even if he shirks because the manager will step in.
Francois argues that this need to pay higher wages under a for-pro…t is the reason why the reduced …nancial incentives in the public sector can be attractive to a social planner, as it would reduce the wage. We follow the basic argument but show that if the for-pro…t is feasible it will weakly increase welfare compared to not-for-pro…t provision (and strictly so under some circumstances).
The idea that intrinsic motivation might lead to a wage di¤erential between the for-and not-for-pro…t sector has received a fair amount of attention in empirical work. 5 But there are subtle di¤erences in how a wage di¤erential can be interpreted. Francois (2003) argues that workers like to exert more e¤ort in not-for-pro…ts because not-for-pro…t managers have less pecuniary incentives to cut costs elsewhere. According to our model, another interpretation is that managers induce workers to accept lower wages through a commitment to inactivity. This interpretation suggests a gloomier picture of the not-for-pro…t status.
While the e¤ect of competition in output markets on the sectorial mix has been discussed in the theoretical literature on not-for-pro…ts 6 the effect of competition for workers on organizational choice remains relatively unexplored. 7 A related paper in this respect is Besley and Ghatak (2005) .
In their model, mission oriented managers and workers have an interest to match with each other because this implies higher output inside the match.
However, their work does not discuss the role of the nondistribution constraint in this context. The bene…ts from motivated agents depend entirely on the worker/manager match but are independent of the organizational form. Another related paper is Macchiavello (2008) who study the selection of motivated workers into the public vs. the private sector and the ambiguous role that high wage premium in the public sector can play.
The Model

Basic Framework
In this section we present a simple model of organizational choice. A …rm consists of a worker (W ) and a manager (M ). For now, we take the match between the worker and the manager to be exogenously given and will consider later the consequences of how they are matched via a labor market.
The worker provides labor and the manager owns an asset that is required for production. In addition, the manager can intervene in the production process by allocating additional resources (e¤ort) once the outcome of worker e¤ort is observed. Before production starts, the manager chooses the …rm's organizational form (i.e., choice between for-pro…t and not-for-pro…t status), sets wages, and terms of employment (e.g., the worker can be …red in the case of bad performance). The worker then accepts or rejects the o¤ered contract. In case she rejects she remains unemployed and the manager proceeds alone.
Production proceeds as follows. The worker moves …rst and chooses whether to work (e W = 1) or shirk (e W = 0) in the production of …rst stage output (y 1 ), given by y 1 = e W . If she exerts e¤ort she incurs an e¤ort cost of 1: Both e¤orts are non-contractible, as in models of moral hazard in teams.
The intermediate output, y 1 , is observed by the manager but not by any third party. As a result, either input-based or output-based (or, piece rate) contracts are not feasible. 8 If the project is in danger of failing (y 1 = 0) the manager decides whether he wants to exert e¤ort (e M = 1) or not (e M = 0) : Second stage output is then determined by his e¤ort choice: y 2 = e M . The cost of e¤ort by the manager is c 1 and will be discussed below in more detail. 9 Project success (max(y 1 ; y 2 ) = 1) yields a …nancial return of . In addition, we assume that manager and worker are intrinsically motivated. Both derive some utility from the project being successful. In particular, we assume that the output of the project is a public good to the worker and the manager. They receive a bene…t of j (j = W; M ) from project success independently of their own e¤ort and organizational form of the …rm. 10 As an example, we can think of a research project. If the project is successful then both the worker (a research assistant, a …eld worker, or a laboratory assistant) and the manager receive a positive non-pecuniary payo¤ because it helps society in some way. In addition, there are some …nancial bene…ts which can consist of research grants, salary increases, increased budget for the research group, or money obtained from patenting the innovation. The worker and the manager both have the skill to provide 8 We show in Appendix G that the main trade-o¤s remain in place when the manager can contract on output. We use e¢ ciency wages for simplicity, relevance as well as comparability with the existing literature (in particular, Francois, 2000 Francois, , 2003 . 9 In this formulation the two types of e¤ort are substitutes (as in Francois, 2000, and 2003 ) and this naturally exacerbates the problem of free riding. The results go through so long as the e¤orts are not strong complements.
1 0 In the terminology of Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) we assume output-oriented altruism as opposed to action-oriented altruism.
the appropriate labor input but for reasons of comparative advantage the worker is hired to do it. However, if the worker does not provide it then the manager has the choice to step in and save the project, or let it fail.
We assume that not-for-pro…ts are characterized by a non-distribution constraint, i.e., the manager cannot take home all the pro…t, , in case of project success. 11 Below we follow the formulation of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) of the non-distribution constraint. In particular, we assume that committing to a non-distribution constraint means that the manager can still capture some share of the pro…ts . In their interpretation, the share 1 is lost because the manager's technology of capturing some of the pro…ts is ine¢ cient (e.g., in the form of perks) -it is equivalent to burning a fraction 1 of the pro…ts. 12 We allow the manager to choose any
is then de…ned by < 1 and a for-pro…t …rm by = 1. We assume that the choice of has no direct costs. Figure 1 summarizes the resulting game tree for the production process.
Given that the worker's e¤ort and output is not veri…able, the manager can only pay a …xed wage, w. Following the e¢ ciency wage literature, we assume that the manager can motivate the worker by threatening to …re her in case she is caught shirking as in standard e¢ ciency wage models.
Naturally, the worker will have to earn some rents for the …ring threats to have bite. We assume that the worker has no liquid wealth and there is a limited liability constraint so that the worker's wage cannot be less than some minimum level (which we assume to be zero for simplicity). Otherwise, performance bonds or penalties could be used to give additional incentives.
The worker is caught shirking and …red with certainty if e W = 0 and never …red if e W = 1. Let 1 denote the probability of a currently unemployed worker staying unemployed. 13 Since in equilibrium workers do not shirk 1 1 The manager could pay himself a ‡at wage and if output was constant, he could appropriate the pro…ts by setting this wage to be high. If output is variable then he will not be able to appropriate the surplus with a …xed wage. 1 2 See also Hansmann (1980, p. 873-875) for some anecdotal support for this formulation. Another possible interpretation is that the share (1 ) goes to the bene…ciaries in some form. We discuss the welfare outcomes for both scenarios in section 3.4. 1 3 In order to keep the model as simple as possible we assume that this probability is and are never …red, without loss of generality our analysis will focus on the one-shot payo¤s of managers and workers.
Let e W and e M denote the e¤ort choice of the worker and the manager that are induced by the choice of and w via the incentive-compatibility constraints of the worker and the manager (see below). Let u M and u W be the outside options of the manager and the worker, respectively. The manager's problem is:
subject to the following constraints:
(i) the participation constraint (PC) of the manager:
(ii) the PC of the worker:
max (e W ; e M ) W e W + w u W ;
(iii) the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of the manager:
(iv) the ICC of the worker:
where < 1 is a discount factor and 1 is the worker's probability of not a¤ected by labor market conditions. For the same reason we assume that there is no noise in the supervision technology, and once employed a worker who does not shirk keeps his job forever (i.e., there is no chance of exogenous break up of a match).
staying unemployed once …red. Solving out the ICC of the worker, we get
The manager's ICC in equation (1) states that …nancial plus intrinsic bene…ts of the project must be higher than the intervention cost c for him to exert e¤ort. The worker's ICC is derived in Appendix A. It states that the worker exerts e¤ort if the present value of wage and intrinsic bene…t from project success minus e¤ort costs is higher than the present value of free-riding on manager e¤ort and being …red after one period.
The PCs are given by the expected bene…ts of the contract ( ; w) chosen by the manager and the respective outside options of manager and worker.
For simplicity we assume for now that the manager can and will provide the public good on his own, at cost c. Under this assumption his outside option is:
The manager's PC can then be rewritten as
Since the worker has no control rights she is not able to produce anything outside the …rm. In order to keep the model simple we assume that the worker does not bene…t from the public good provision of the …rm if she does not work in it which is a reasonable assumption if the output is not observable outside the …rm. The worker's outside option is therefore
When we allow for endogenous matching, the outside option would be the best o¤er made by another organization.
This gives the worker's PC:
Throughout, in order to focus on the interesting cases, we restrict attention to parameter values that satisfy:
If A1 is violated the manager is either always committed to no e¤ort (i.e., 
Organizational Choice
The not-for-pro…t status comes at the cost of decreased rents to the manager, but with the bene…t of lower wages. It will be chosen if the latter outweighs the former. This section derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this to be the case.
The key to understanding the role of not-for-pro…ts lies in the manager ICC, namely, equation (1) . The inequality shows that reducing the pro…t share reduces the incentives of the manager to bail out a failing project because it reduces his …nancial bene…t from project success. In other words, not-for-pro…t status can be used to reach commitment vis a vis the worker.
If is su¢ ciently low in the not-for-pro…t, the worker knows that her e¤ort will be crucial for project success. This ability of the not-for-pro…t to commit the manager to no e¤ort is crucial for its attractiveness from the perspective of the manager. If A1 is violated the choice of does not a¤ect either the manager's incentives (1) or the worker's incentives (2). Since lowering from 1 directly reduces the manager's utility, < 1 is never chosen if the inequalities in A1 are not ful…lled.
If A1 if ful…lled, however, the manager can commit to let the project fail (e M = 0) by adopting not-for-pro…t status. Formally, commitment is reached if the pro…t share satis…es:
The interpretation is, the monetary bene…t is lower than the costs over and above what the manager is compensated for by intrinsic motivation, c M . The threshold follows immediately from the manager's ICC, namely, equation (1) . It is important to note that in this model the reduction of …nancial incentives has no direct positive e¤ects (like increased investments or quality) but only serves as a commitment device for the manager. However, we show below that the advantage of not-for-pro…t status for the manager is that it might reduce wage payments.
From the worker's ICC, equation (2), the minimum wage needed to induce worker e¤ort can be written as:
(because we restrict attention to W 1 the non-negativity constraint never binds strictly) where
Notice that, as < 1 and 1, A > 1: The interpretation of A is it is the e¢ ciency wage for a worker who has no intrinsic motivation ( W = 0). As the cost of e¤ort is 1; and the outside option is zero, A has to be greater than 1 for the agent to receive any rents. The lower is (more impatient is the worker) and the lower is (the easier it is for an unemployed worker to …nd a job), the incentive problem is larger, and so the higher will be A:
Lemma 1 Assume A1 holds. Then not-for-pro…ts with have to pay a smaller wage to workers to motivate worker e¤ ort (e W = 1) than any …rm with > , in particular, = 1.
Proof. For e M = 0 from (5) we get:
and for e M = 1, it is:
As A > 1, w (0) < w(1) for all 1 W 0: For the lemma to hold we also have to make sure that the worker's PC, equation (4), is satis…ed. For a for-pro…t, e W = e M = 1 and so the worker's PC is W + w(1) 1: As A > 1 this is satis…ed. Similarly, for a not-for-pro…t, e W = 1 and e M = 0 and so
and W 1, this is satis…ed. Now the proof follows from the fact that non-pro…ts with commit the manager to inactivity (i.e., e M = 0).
Lemma 1 states that the incentive-compatible wage is lower in not-forpro…ts than in for-pro…ts. The intuition is simple: if the manager is very motivated he saves the project in case it is about to fail (e M = 1) and the worker receives W regardless of her e¤ort level. She is then tempted to freeride on the public good provision by the manager and a higher e¢ ciency wage is needed to motivate her to supply e¤ort. In the not-for-pro…t the manager can reduce the pro…t share to and commit to e M = 0. This increases e¤ort incentives for the worker because the worker now knows that without her e¤ort the project will fail.
Henceforth we will refer to w(0) as w N P and w(1) as w F P : Table 1 summarizes the optimal wages and pro…t share for for-pro…ts and not-forpro…ts. The optimal pro…t share in the not-for-pro…t is because any further reduction would just reduce the retained pro…ts of the manager but would not have any impact on the wage. Table 1 shows that e¢ ciency wages are reduced by worker intrinsic motivation both in the for and not-for-pro…t.
However, the wage reduction is higher in the not-for-pro…t. 14 1 4 This is similar to the result in Besley and Ghatak (2005) that motivated workers are given less high-powered incentive schemes which results in lower expected wages, and like it, suggests that workers, if possible, would like to conceal their intrinsic motivation. We abstract from issues of observability of intrinsic motivation (or lack thereof), and consequently, the role of signalling and screening (see Benabou and Tirole, 2006 and Optimal Wage (w) Optimal Pro…t Share ( ) for-pro…t The payo¤ of the manager under a not-for-pro…t is + M w N P while his payo¤ under a for-pro…t is + M w F P : The PCs of the manager under these two organizational forms are:
and
These can be rewritten as:
These conditions are intuitive. They mean that the wage in the not-forpro…t plus the pro…t lost due to not-for-pro…t status needs to be smaller than the e¤ort cost for the manager in autarchy. In the for-pro…t the wage has to be smaller than the manager's cost of e¤ort. Substituting values of w N P and w F P these can be simpli…ed to:
Now we turn to characterizing conditions when a not-for-pro…t will be Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008) chosen. We make the following assumption:
This is a necessary condition for not-for-pro…ts to satisfy the manager's PC.
If c is too low relative to the project bene…ts then the manager will never …nd it attractive to choose the not-for-pro…t and will prefer autarchy. Now we characterize conditions under which the trade-o¤ between reduced …nancial return and reduced wages can lead to not-for-pro…ts being preferred to for-pro…ts:
Proposition 1 Assume A1 and A2 hold. The manager prefers the not-forpro…t to a for-pro…t if and only if
However, workers never prefer the not-for-pro…t to a for-pro…t because the not-for-pro…t wage is lower.
Proof. See the appendix. The intuition to the …rst part of the proposition is simple. If worker intrinsic motivation is high, the manager bene…ts from a not-for-pro…t because it reduces wages substantially. The loss of pro…t from adopting the not-for-pro…t status relative to the for-pro…t status is (1 ) , which can be rewritten + M c. In other words, not-for-pro…t status leads to a bigger loss if the project is very attractive from the manager's point of view.
Therefore, the manager prefers the not-for-pro…t to the for-pro…t if his …-nancial and intrinsic bene…ts from the project are not too high relative to the intrinsic motivation of the worker.
The worker's preference for the for-pro…t is surprising given the usual perception that intrinsically motivated workers prefer not-for-pro…t …rms.
In our model, under both the for-pro…t and the not-for-pro…t, the output is the same but the former pays a higher wage. E¤ectively, in not-for-pro…t …rms, the manager free rides on the intrinsically motivated worker. 15 This highlights an important di¤erence to other models in the literature which derive not-for-pro…t status from contractual failure vis a vis the bene…ciary. The di¤erence becomes clear if we re-interpret the worker as a donor.
In our model, the not-for-pro…t is a commitment device by the manager to stay inactive if the donor does not donate to the …rm. This commitment increases donations but does not necessarily improve the welfare of the bene…ciary. If the donor could choose he would donate to a for-pro…t.
Notice that our result is driven by the fact that managers will produce the public good even if they do not …nd a motivated worker, which is ensured by Assumption A1: It might seem that this biases the choice against notfor-pro…ts. But if A1 does not hold, then not-for-pro…ts cannot exist as the manager is either always committed to no e¤ort or always committed to supply e¤ort.
Our framework allows us to examine the e¤ects of changes in manager and worker motivation on organizational choice very clearly.
By A1 the existence of a not-for-pro…t industry generally depends on a relatively low level of intrinsic bene…ts M : If M > c, Assumption A1 is violated and the not-for-pro…t looses its ability to commit the manager to no e¤ort. As a result, for-pro…ts are always chosen. On the other hand, if M = 0; not-for-pro…ts can exist so long as the conditions in Proposition 1 are satis…ed. Also, keeping total pro…tability ( + M ) constant, not-forpro…ts are less likely with more motivated managers. We summarize this as:
The greater is the intrinsic motivation of the manager ( M ) the less likely not-for-pro…ts will be the chosen organizational form.
The intuition is simple. Since the key issue is free-riding, if the manager is very motivated, he cannot commit not to work on the project in case the worker shirks. But then there is no point in making costly organizational choices in order to try to commit. This provides a theory of the choice between for-pro…t social enterprises and not-for-pro…ts. Social enterprises can be organized as either for-pro…ts or not-for-pro…ts and combine a revenue generating business with a social value generating component. They pursue what is often referred to as a double bottom-line which is a combination of pro…t and mission-related impact. It is argued that revenue generation allows social enterprises to be self-sustaining and pro…ts attract additional capital to solve social ills. 16 Next we turn to worker motivation. Clearly, if workers are unmotivated ( W = 0) then not-for-pro…ts will never be chosen. Proposition 1 shows that worker motivation will have to exceed some positive threshold for notfor-pro…ts to become an attractive option. What happens if workers are very motivated? Recall that so far we have restricted attention to W 1 to keep the exposition simple. Suppose A > W > 1. Now w N P = 0 but
Therefore, inserting these in the condition for not-forpro…ts to be chosen, i.e., w F P w N P + M c; we get
In other words, if the worker is very motivated then for-pro…ts become attractive relative to not-for-pro…ts, because the former allows the manager to bene…t more from extra worker motivation through lower wages than the latter, where the wage hits a lower bound. If W > A, then w N P = w F P = 0 and for-pro…ts will always be chosen. This is intuitive, because the only reason to choose not-for-pro…ts in our framework (which is costly to the manager in the form of having to give up full residual claimancy) is it can yield lower wages. If both for-pro…t and not-for-pro…t wages are equal, then for-pro…ts will be preferred. We summarize this as:
Observation 2 If the worker has very low or very high intrinsic motivation then for-pro…ts will be preferred by the manager. Not-for-pro…ts can arise only for intermediate levels of worker motivation.
We will see in the next section that another force that could lead to forpro…ts and not-for-pro…ts to have equal wages is labor market competition for motivated workers and this too would lead the former being preferred to the latter.
So far we assumed that due to a limited liability constraint, the worker has to be paid non-negative wages. In some settings this may not be a good assumption. There are instances where volunteers or interns pay a fee to serve in an organization. Recall that in our model not-for-pro…t and forpro…t wages are A(1 W ) and A W respectively. Clearly, for W > 1, both wages are negative and the former is less than the latter as A > 1.
Observation 3
If there is no limited liability constraint and the worker can be charged a fee to serve in the organization, not-for-pro…ts would charge a higher fee than for-pro…ts.
Intuitively, both for-pro…ts and not-for-pro…ts charge the worker for her participation in the industry. The worker is willing to pay because unemployment would exclude her from intrinsic bene…ts derived from the project.
Under a for-pro…t the manager cannot commit not to supply e¤ort if the worker does not, and this means the worker will have to be paid a greater premium to supply e¤ort compared to a not-for-pro…t, which in this case, translates into a lower fee that the worker can be charged. The not-forpro…t can charge more because it commits the manager to inactivity. An example might illustrate this point. There is a quickly growing industry of volunteer tourism which combines typical backpacking trips with development work. In this sector, not-for-pro…t …rms provide local development work for the traveler. Most of the …eld work requires only unskilled labor, available in abundance in the local community. Still, volunteers are intrinsically so motivated that they are willing to pay the organization to get work. The web-sites organizing the market strongly suggest that the impact of the volunteer is an important consideration for this willingness to pay. 17 In other words, the labor market features payments from the worker to the organization (a negative wage) in return for the opportunity to make a di¤erence.
Labor Markets and Organizational Choice
This section extends the model derived in the previous section to a labor market setting where a number of workers and managers match endogenously. The aim of this exercise is to show that labor market conditions and organizational choice are closely linked, a point that existing theories of not-for-pro…ts have ignored.
Assume that there are M managers with intrinsic motivation M 0, N m motivated workers with W > 0 and N u unmotivated or neutral workers
In what follows we assume that there is some unemployment,
However, we will allow the degree to which motivated workers are scarce to vary, i.e., N m ? M .
At the matching stage managers choose a contract ( ; w) to maximize their expected utility EU (e W ; e M ) subject to the PC of themselves and that of the worker. A stable matching is one where no change of match could strictly increase a manager's or worker's utility without making the new matching partner worse o¤ compared to how she was before. Production takes place once a stable matching is reached.
A crucial question for the e¤ect of the labor market on organizational choice is whether the for-pro…t organizational form can satisfy the manager's PC. Assume …rst that for-pro…ts are feasible in the sense that the manager always prefers to be in a for-pro…t than to produce alone.
Proposition 2 Assume A1 and that for-pro…t provision is feasible, i.e., c A W . If motivated labor is scarce (N m < M ) then not-for-pro…t …rms cannot exist in labor market equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Assume that there are some not-for-pro…ts in a matching equilibrium with N m < M . First, note that by Proposition 1 workers prefer to work in for-pro…ts. As motivated workers are scarce (N m < M ) there are some managers who are matched with an unmotivated worker. These managers will always set up for-pro…t …rms because not-for-pro…t status does not reduce their wage bill, w = A. A worker in a not-for-pro…t …rm can therefore improve her position by replacing an unmotivated worker in a for-pro…t match. The manager will accept this swap because he prefers a for-pro…t match with a motivated worker to a for-pro…t match with an unmotivated worker.
An immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1 Assume A1 and that for-pro…t provision is feasible, c A W . If motivated workers are abundant (N m > M ) then not-for-pro…ts can exist in labor market equilibrium and Proposition 1 applies.
Proposition 2 provides a pessimistic view of not-for-pro…t …rms. It states that if the adoption of not-for-pro…t status is motivated by the desire to use intrinsic motivation of workers to reduce wages then a slack labor market is a necessary condition for this to be feasible. The reason is simply that given a choice, workers always want to work for a higher wage. As we showed in the previous section, the incentive-compatible wage rate is lower in a notfor-pro…t than in a for-pro…t. In a labor surplus situation, not-for-pro…ts can therefore exist. But in a labor-scarce situation, only the higher wage rate is relevant and so not-for-pro…ts will be crowded out of the market by for-pro…ts.
An important insight from this result is that the choice between not-forpro…t and for-pro…t provision is not always a question of resolving incentive problems but also one of distribution of rents. In both organizational forms the worker provides the good at e¤ort cost of 1. The only di¤erence is the wage that the manager has to pay to the worker. From this point of view, the not-for-pro…t is a method of redistributing rents towards the manager of the …rm. Therefore, our analysis suggests that organizational choice would depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers and managers. An interesting comparative static result that follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3 is that, as c rises for-pro…ts can become feasible, and an industry that produces public goods might change from not-for-pro…t provision to for-pro…t provision. If we interpret c as the level of specialization in the labor force, not-for-pro…ts will be most common in industries that combine high level of worker intrinsic motivation with a low level of specialization. 18 1 8 This comparative static is partly supported by a survey among 1900 persons responsible for human resources (HR) in the voluntary sector in England (Clark (2007) ). The study shows that vacancies which require speci…c skills were most likely to be categorized as hard to …ll by the HR personal. It is not clear, however, whether this was due to general scarcities or a not-for-pro…t phenomena.
Welfare
So far we have focused on the choice between not-for-pro…ts and for-pro…ts from the point of view of the manager. In this section we discuss the welfare implications. In order to keep the focus on the comparison between not-forpro…ts and for-pro…ts we assume throughout that the manager's PC does not bind in any of the two organizational forms.
Before we turn towards the welfare implications, however, we turn towards a brief discussion of …rst-best e¤ort. First-best e¤ort maximizes total surplus. For the second stage this implies that the manager should exert e¤ort (e M = 1) if y 1 = 0 and
and e M = 0 otherwise. Notice that A1 implies that the above condition holds. Also, the condition for the worker to exert e¤ort (e W = 1) in the …rst stage is + W + M 1 0, and this is implied by the above condition as by assumption c 1:
Not-for-pro…ts commit the manager to no e¤ort in our model because a share of pro…ts (1 ) cannot be captured by him. The …rst question is whether the share of pro…t that is lost to the manager is a deadweight loss (as in Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001 ), because, for example, he consumes it in the form of perks even though he would have preferred to have it in the form of cash, or whether it is redistributed towards the bene…ciary of the project (as in Easly and O´Hara, 1983). If we assume the former, then choosing not-for-pro…ts over for-pro…ts will always decrease welfare. This is because the e¤ort allocation does not change but not-for-pro…ts waste resources by making it harder for the manager to capture the pro…t.
If the pro…t share (1 ) is redistributed and not wasted, both organizational forms are equivalent in terms of welfare. To see this, note that all that matters for welfare in this case is who exerts e¤ort. In both the for-pro…t and the not-for-pro…t the manager pays the worker an e¢ ciency wage so that the worker does supply e¤ort, and, therefore, the cost of production is one. For-pro…t and not-for-pro…t are therefore equivalent in terms of welfare. The only di¤erence between the organizational forms is that the not-for-pro…t distributes more of the gains to the manager (and to a third party) and less to the worker. However, as we will see in the next section, the equivalence between for-and not-for-pro…ts depends on our strong assumption that production is non-stochastic and it is su¢ cient for either the worker or the manager to supply e¤ort for the project to go through.
Extension: Stochastic Project Success
The basic model presented above is based on a particular simplifying assumption removing which will add an extra e¤ect that will go against the choice of not-for-pro…ts. In particular, the assumption that the project always succeeds in case of worker e¤ort reduces the welfare loss caused by manager commitment in the not-for-pro…t. If projects could fail despite worker e¤ort then there is a positive role to be played by an active manager.
To see this, assume that worker and manager e¤ort lead to project success with a probability h < 1. The ICC of the manager changes to:
e M (h; ; ; c; M ) =
From the ICC we can see immediately that the that commits the manager to no e¤ort is now
which implies that assumption A1 has to be modi…ed to
We derive the two e¢ ciency wages in the appendix, they are
for the not-for-pro…t and
for the for-pro…t, where A 1+(1 ) as before.
First note, that the for-pro…t wage can now actually be lower than the not-for-pro…t wage if Ah < 1. This is because the worker bene…ts from being employed in a company that has a motivated manager even if the worker exerts e¤ort himself. If h is relatively small this factor weighs more heavily.
Intuitively, an increasing failure rate 1 h increases the chance that the manager has to exert e¤ort despite worker e¤ort. This additional bene…t is re ‡ected in e¢ ciency wages. In order to make not-for-pro…t dominance possible we need to assume that Assumption A4 : Ah 1 so that w F P w N P . For non-negativity of wages it then su¢ ces to assume that W < 1 h . We discuss the manager PCs in the appendix. As before, in order for the not-for-pro…t to be feasible we need to assume that
Given these assumptions it is still possible that the not-for-pro…t is chosen by the manager. However, this can only be the case if the wage gains compensate the manager not only for lost pro…ts but also for a loss in productivity. To see this, note that the manager prefers the not-for-pro…t if
where the third term on the right-hand side represents the productivity bene…t for the manager. If the project is about to fail (with probability 1 h) the manager in the for-pro…t can intervene. The following proposition then characterizes the conditions under which not-for-pro…ts will be chosen:
Proposition 4 Assume that A3, A4 and A5 hold. The manager prefers the not-for-pro…t to the for-pro…t if
Proof. See the appendix. Proposition 4 follows proposition 1 closely in the intuition. It states that not-for-pro…ts can be preferred if worker intrinsic motivation is large compared to the bene…ts of project success.
The e¢ ciency gain in the for-pro…t also makes for-pro…t status more attractive to the worker because the average provision rate is higher under that organizational form. Hence, for-pro…ts dominate not-for-pro…ts in terms of welfare even if the not-for-pro…t does not waste resources (i.e., the fraction 1 goes to third parties). To see this note that welfare under a for-pro…t is higher if
where the left-hand-side displays welfare under a for-pro…t and the righthand side is the welfare under a not-for-pro…t. By assumption A2 this is always satis…ed because h ( + M + W ) > c.
In summary, our analysis above o¤ers an interesting insight concerning the choice of not-for-pro…t status. Even if not-for-pro…ts may yield lower expected surplus than for-pro…ts, they might be chosen because of the rent extraction (i.e., paying the worker low wages) vs. e¢ ciency trade-o¤ that the manager faces. Even if it is socially e¢ cient for both the worker and the manager to supply e¤ort, the manager might want to tie his hands behind his back and commit not to supply e¤ort if the need arises, in order to relax the worker's ICC.
Discussion
Our analysis suggests that organizational choice between for-pro…ts and notfor-pro…ts would depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers and managers. In particular, the abundance of motivated labor in some sectors may lead to the rise of not-for-pro…t organizations. Figure 2 provides a crude look at the existing cross-country evidence regarding the connection between not-for-pro…t (paid) employment and unemployment rates. 19 For comparability we only focus on OECD countries. The graph 
Conclusion
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-pro…ts based on free-riding developed by Francois (2000 Francois ( , 2003 . We embed the choice of for-pro…ts vs. not-for-pro…ts in a labor market setting where …rms and workers match endogenously. We show that motivated workers are better o¤ working in a for-pro…t …rm compared to a not-for-pro…t …rm. We show that if …rms had to compete for workers not-for-pro…t …rms would be competed out by for-pro…t …rms. As a result we conclude that the reason for the existence of not-for-pro…t organizations may be because of the excess supply of motivated workers that make the non-pro…t form more attractive to managers. We also show that, assuming both organizational forms are feasible, for-pro…ts welfare dominate not-for-pro…ts, and strictly so, if production involves some uncertainty.
Appendix A E¢ ciency Wage
The worker is assumed to be in…nitely lived. If the worker is employed and exerts e¤ort, she is not …red, and receives the present value of
We assume here that the worker is …red with certainty if she shirks and remains unemployed with probability once she is in that state. Unemployment bene…ts are normalized to 0. Also, we assume that workers do not observe any activity within …rms if they are unemployed, in particular, whether or not the public good is provided, and who supplies the e¤ort. 21 Therefore, if unemployed, the worker earns a present value of
This simpli…es to
where we inserted the present value of employment with e¤ort.
If the worker shirks she is caught with certainty, and her present value of utility is S = w + e M W + U:
The dependence on e M re ‡ects the assumption that the manager cannot immediately replace a worker if she is …red, and will have to supply e¤ort himself for that period. 
B Proof of Proposition 1
The manager prefers the not-for-pro…t to a for-pro…t if Inserting w F P and w N P we get:
Also, the condition for not-for-pro…ts to satisfy the manager's PC is, rewriting (6):
Given A2 this condition is consistent with W 1: The above two conditions can be combined as (8) . The worker prefers the not-for-pro…t if
which, given Lemma 1 is never the case. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The relevant choice for the manager is between working alone and setting up a not-for-pro…t. Therefore, the relevant condition combines the condition for a not-for-pro…t to be chosen over autarchy, and for-pro…ts not satisfying the manager's PC, i.e., rewriting inequalities (6) and (7) in terms of W and combining them.
D Wages with Stochastic Success
With e¤ort the worker's utility is
The unemployed worker has an expected utility of Simplifying, and solving for w we get:
Therefore, the wage in the not-for-pro…t is:
In the for-pro…t, it is:
which simpli…es to the condition given in the text.
E Manager PCs with Stochastic Success
The manager's PC in the for-pro…t is
In the not-for-pro…t, it is:
Given our assumption of non-negative wages (h W 1) we need to assume that c h ( + M ) 2 :
F Proof of Proposition 4
The proof for Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The condition for the not-for-pro…t is preferred is:
Plugging in = c h M and the wages, we get:
After rearranging and with A = 1+(1 ) we get:
The PC of the manager in the not-for-pro…t is:
This can be rewritten as:
or,
G Continuous E¤ort and Incentive Schemes
We show here that our key results are not driven by either our assumption of continuous e¤ort nor our assumptions about contractibility. Let us assume that intermediate output in contractible so that a wage can be paid that is contingent on it.
We assume, as before, that manager and worker move consecutively. 
The e¤ect of on wages is then
For not-for-pro…ts to be ever chosen, we must have w > 0 at = 1: This is the case if:
which follows directly from the su¢ cient condition for an interior solution for the manager's choice of e¤ort.
Manager:
απ + θM -w απ + θM -c -w -w 
Worker
